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The challenges associated with climate change will require governments, citizens, and firms to 
work collaboratively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a task that requires information on 
companies’ emissions levels, risks, and reduction opportunities. This paper explores the conditions 
under which firms participate in this endeavor. Building on theories of how social activists inspire 
changes in organizational norms, beliefs, and practices, we hypothesize that shareholder actions 
and regulatory threats are likely to prime firms to adopt practices consistent with the aims of a 
broader social movement. We find empirical evidence of direct and spillover effects. In the 
domain of private politics, shareholder resolutions filed against it and others in its industry 
increase a firm’s propensity to engage in practices consistent with the aims of the related social 
movement. Similarly, in the realm of public politics, threats of state regulations targeted at a 
firm’s industry as well as regulations targeted at other industries increase the likelihood that the 
firm will engage in such practices. These findings extend existing theory by showing that both 
activist groups and government actors can spur changes in organizational practices, and that 
challenges mounted against a single firm and an industry can inspire both firm and field-level 
changes. 
 
Keywords: social movements theory; institutional change theory; private politics; activist 
shareholder resolutions; climate change; environmental sustainability 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Social movements have long engaged governments in their change efforts, most often by 
lobbying public officials to enable or restrict certain types of citizen or business activities. While 
activists have generally paired these public political efforts with appeals for private citizens’ 
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support, activists’ efforts to directly engage businesses have grown more aggressive in recent 
years. This newfound emphasis on direct engagement has been described as private politics. 
Defined as “situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on the law or government” 
(Baron, 2003: 31), private political tactics are in vogue among activists across a spectrum of 
social domains that includes the natural environment (King and Toffel, forthcoming) and labor 
and human rights protection (Proffitt and Spicer, 2006). Most empirical research on private 
politics has focused on the strategies and tactics of social activists, but when and how firms 
respond to these pressures is much less understood. 
This paper explores corporate responses to shareholder activism. To date, scholarship on 
shareholder activism has focused largely on shareholder resolutions. We examine an alternative 
mechanism increasingly employed by shareholder groups to encourage greater corporate 
transparency: direct appeals to management. Many activist investors have begun to collaborate 
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that request that executive managers at leading 
firms disclose information about corporate social actions. For instance, CERES, an NGO that 
represents investors, requested Nike to disclose details about its contract factories.
1 Similarly, 
investors associated with the United Nations (UN) Principles for Responsible Investment 
initiative lobby firms to join the UN Global Compact, which encourages companies to align their 
practices with certain environmental, social, and governance principles, and to publicly report 
their progress.
2 Appeals to participate in these initiatives effectively function as requests that 
firms adopt new disclosure practices consistent with a social movement’s aim of encouraging 
greater corporate transparency.  
                                                 
1 CERES, “About Us,” http://www.ceres.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=415&srcid=554, accessed July 23, 
2008. 
2 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, “Global Investors Issue US$4 Trillion Incentive for 
Sustainability,” http://www.unpri.org/files/prfinalef2610.pdf, accessed March 23 2009. 3 
 
Social movements theory offers a promising theoretical framework for understanding 
why firms might respond to these direct appeals. In exploring how citizen movements struggle to 
influence the state, scholars in this domain have developed a rich toolkit of constructs and 
mechanisms that offer insight into how targeted social activism might generate organizational 
change. These approaches have helped deepen our understanding of several forms of activist 
pressures including company boycotts (King, 2008),  and employee activism (Briscoe and 
Safford, 2008).  
We build on a model of how social activists spur organizational change (den Hond and de 
Bakker, 2007) to assess whether and how prior experiences with both private and public politics 
might influence firms’ responses to direct appeals from shareholder groups. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that organizations will be more likely to respond to such appeals by engaging in new 
practices if they, or other members of their institutional field, have been subjected to formal 
shareholder pressure or are threatened by government regulation on a related issue. 
Our study is situated in the context of the climate change mitigation movement. Activists 
associated with this movement regularly engage in both public and private politics, lobbying 
governments to establish binding constraints on greenhouse gas emissions and simultaneously 
urging companies to take proactive measures including disclosing information on their carbon 
risks, strategies, and emissions. Gathering and sharing comprehensive information about the 
risks, exposure, and opportunities associated with climate change can lead companies to begin 
analyzing their own operations, identifying opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
and developing climate change policies (Lash and Wellington, 2007; U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Carbon Disclosure Project, 2007), and can also inform decision-
making and planning by policymakers.  4 
 
Our analysis focuses on the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a London-based NGO that 
represents more than 300 institutional investors with a combined $57 trillion in assets under 
management. Each year, CDP asks the top executive managers of the world’s largest public 
companies to disclose information about the risks and opportunities posed by climate change, the 
strategies being pursued to address them, and company-wide greenhouse gas emissions. In 2006 
and 2007, 44% of S&P 500 Index companies responded to this request by publicly disclosing at 
least some portion of the requested information. By participating in CDP’s process, these firms 
were not only providing information to CDP and the investors it represented, but were also 
engaging in new and extensive disclosure practices neither common nor required in the United 
States. Our paper explores why nearly half of these companies chose to engage in these new 
practices.  
Our empirical results support our hypotheses. We find that firms that have been targeted, 
and firms in industries in which other firms have been targeted, by shareholder actions on 
environmental issues are more likely to publicly disclose information to the CDP. We further 
find that firms headquartered in states with proposed greenhouse gas regulations, which 
remained uncertain in terms of stringency and scope, are more likely than other firms to publicly 
disclose information to the CDP. 
This study makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the growing literature on 
social movements and organizations. Although many studies have examined external activists’ 
motives and strategies (e.g., Bartley and Child, 2007; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; Proffitt and 
Spicer, 2006), rather less is known about how firms interpret and respond to pressures exerted on 
them by external activism. We bridge this gap by examining firms’ responses to both shareholder 
resolutions and threats of government regulation. We respond to Schneiberg and Lounsbury’s 5 
 
(2008: 661) call to “systematize theory construction…isolate effects, and strengthen inferences 
about movement...outcomes” through more multivariate quantitative research on social 
movements and organizations by extending and testing theories of social activism and 
organizational change. Finally, ours is one of the first large-scale empirical studies to examine 
the extent to which both private and public politics elicit changes in management practices 
within both targeted organizations and other firms in their institutional fields. 
THEORY  
Traditionally, social movements theory has examined how activists elicit and marshal 
popular support to mobilize the public political process with the goal of influencing legislation, 
regulation, and judicial interpretations to institutionalize new sets of norms (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006), defining the state as the target of social activists (Davis, McAdam, Scott, and Zald, 
2005). More recently, a number of scholars have extended social movements theory to 
encompass forms of private politics by examining how social activism might directly influence 
corporate behavior (e.g., Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Davis et al., 2005; King, 2008; McAdam 
and Scott, 2005; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008).  
To explore how private and public political pressure can affect firms’ responses to 
overtures from social movements, we draw on the model of social activism and organizational 
change proposed by den Hond and de Bakker (2007), who argue that activist groups elicit 
changes in organizations’ perceptions of their social responsibilities and corresponding practices 
by challenging firms’ existing set of institutional field “frames.” Institutional fields, defined as 
“sets of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional life,” include “key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that 
produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148-149). Field frames are 6 
 
“the technical, legal, or market standards that define the normal modes of operation within that 
specific field” that help to structure firms’ activities and interactions and “provide order and 
stability in an organizational field” (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007: 905). These standards, in 
turn, define the set of appropriate practices, norms, and beliefs that govern the behavior of firms 
within organizational fields (Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch, 2003).  
Den Hond and de Bakker (2007) contend that social activists can elicit organizational 
change by challenging these frames’ legitimacy on the basis of moral principles or pragmatic 
concerns such as financial sustainability. Such challenges are often accompanied by symbolic 
and material damage to the firm, depending on the social activists’ tactics (e.g., boycotts, letter-
writing campaigns, rallies). Firms presented with these challenges are thus motivated to take the 
activist group seriously, and launch into a process of re-theorization that includes re-evaluating 
the premises and content of the challenged frames in terms of the new arguments presented by 
the activists (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002). Firms sufficiently threatened by the 
challenge are likely to generate new frames more consistent with the views espoused by the 
activists, which will alter the set of practices, norms, and beliefs these firms perceive to be 
appropriate. The new frame is institutionalized when its moral legitimacy is affirmed by another 
encounter with the activist group (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Lounsbury et al., 2003). 
We propose two extensions to this framework. First, we suggest that the change process 
be parsed into two levels. On the first level, the challenged firm is prompted by an activist group 
to reconsider its frame; on the second, non-targeted firms within the organizational field also 
respond to the challenge by reconsidering their frames. Activist challenges to a single firm can 
thus destabilize frames for other members of a field. Second, we suggest that government actors 
also be considered change agents. Specifically, we argue that existing frames might also be 7 
 
challenged by government action on social movement issues in the form, for example, of threats 
of new legislation or regulations. We thus posit that a change process that might culminate in the 
adoption of new frames by both targeted firms and other firms within an organizational field can 
be precipitated by both private and public politics. Below, we develop four hypotheses that 
describe how shareholder resolutions and regulatory threats might alter the practices of targeted 
and non-targeted firms in an institutional field.  
Private politics 
Directly targeting companies with shareholder resolutions, consumer boycotts, and 
protests has been conceptualized as “private politics” (Baron, 2003; Baron and Diermeier, 2007). 
Shareholder activism, the “use of ownership position to actively influence company policy and 
practice” (Sjöström, 2008: 142), is an increasingly popular tool of private politics. Historically, it 
assumed many forms including purchasing minority stakes, negotiating behind-the-scenes with 
management teams, and proposing shareholder resolutions with the object of influencing 
decision-making (Gillan and Starks, 2007). In the United States, shareholder activism in its 
modern form dates to 1942, when shareholders were first permitted to propose resolutions to be 
voted on by all shareholders. Initially, these proposals were put forward by small groups of 
easily ignored investors, but in the mid-1980s, institutional investors, NGOs, and unions began 
to play an increasingly prominent role in this type of shareholder activism (Gillan and Starks, 
2007; Sjöström, 2008). Having grown in popularity and scope in the ensuing decades, the 
practice is currently employed to address a wide array of issues ranging from executive 
compensation, to labor rights, to environmental responsibility (Slater, 2007).  
Shareholder resolutions and organizational change 8 
 
We maintain that shareholder resolutions directly challenge prevailing organizational 
field frames, prompting corporate managers and boards of directors to reconsider them in light of 
the alternative frames being proposed. Consistent with the characteristics of successful 
challenges to field frames (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2002), shareholder 
resolutions often dispute both the morality and financial sustainability of current corporate 
practices (Proffitt and Spicer, 2006; Slater, 2007). A shareholder resolution filed with Allegheny 
Energy in 1999 that called for extensive disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions, emissions 
abatement strategies, and climate risks, for example, combined both types of appeals. An appeal 
to the firm’s moral responsibility: 
So far our company has not lived up to its responsibility as a producer of the 
pollution which causes global warming. In order to leave the children of the world 
a safe and healthy environment and protect threatened plants and animals, it is 
time for Allegheny to catch up with the companies…preparing for the future now 
by taking the concrete steps necessary to assess their opportunities for reducing 
the amount of carbon pollution they produce.  
  
was followed immediately by a pragmatic appeal: 
Failing to rise to the challenge set by industry leaders will hurt our company’s 
competitiveness and cost our shareholders increasing amounts of money (KLD 
Research & Analytics, 2008). 
  
Boards of directors and executive management teams oppose nearly all shareholder 
resolutions, perhaps because the demands they contain are too far from current practices to be 
considered feasible, or because managers are reluctant to cede decision-making power to activist 
shareholders (Hoffman, 1996; Rehbein, Waddock, and Graves, 2004; Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, 
and Auld, 2006). As a result, shareholder resolutions on environmental and social topics have 
seldom received more than 10% of votes (O’Rourke, 2003).
3   
                                                 
3 Even low approval rates may constitute a form of success for some activist shareholder organizations because SEC 
guidelines allow the resolution to be proposed in a subsequent annual shareholder meeting if approval rates exceed 
 9 
 
Dismal passage rates notwithstanding, we maintain that shareholder resolutions can 
motivate corporate managers and boards of directors to reevaluate corporate practices and launch 
the field frame change process. Activist resolutions can “identify and define problems for 
corporations” and thereby “signal an emerging gap between a firm’s policies and stakeholder 
demands” (Rehbein et al., 2004: 242). To the extent that shareholder resolutions challenge 
current frames, managers of targeted firms are likely to adopt new organizational frames that 
contain practices that are aligned with the activists’ goals. These new frames become observable 
when another activist group requests the firm to engage in the new practices. We thus 
hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1: A firm is more likely to engage in practices consistent with the aims of a 
social movement if it has been targeted by a shareholder resolution on a related social 
issue. 
 
Shareholder resolutions and field-level change 
Construed narrowly, a shareholder resolution indicates that a particular activist group 
finds some practice at the targeted firm objectionable. But because proposing shareholder 
resolutions is a public process, we posit that managers of firms within the same institutional field 
as a targeted company, and who share the same practices, will take note of the shareholder 
resolution and, like the targeted firm, modify their frames and adapt their organizational 
practices. We suggest that managers might interpret such resolutions to signal the emergence of a 
social movement that opposes the targeted practice. Greenpeace’s activist protest campaign 
against Royal Dutch/Shell’s decision to sink the Brent Spar, for example, “clearly…was not only 
directed against the intended disposal of this particular decommissioned oil storage platform, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
particular thresholds (ranging from 3% to 10%). Social Investment Forum, “Advocacy & Public Policy: Shareholder 
Resolutions” http://www.socialinvest.org/projects/advocacy/resolutions.cfm (accessed March 24, 2009) 10 
 
against the very principle that oil platforms could be sunk into deep-sea ridges” (den Hond and 
de Bakker, 2007: 902). 
Recognition that their firms, if they exhibit a behavior currently being challenged, might 
be targeted next is often sufficient to motivate managers to take notice of shareholder resolutions 
targeted against other firms in the same field. Instances abound of social activists challenging a 
management practice at one firm and later targeting the same practice at other firms in the same 
industry (Baron and Diermeier, 2007; PETA, 2008). Because this pattern occurs so often, 
companies in the same industry as a firm targeted by an activist campaign might proactively 
embrace some of the proposed changes so as to avoid becoming the next target (Baron and 
Diermeier, 2007; Sasser et al., 2006).  
We believe that firms are likely to react similarly in the context of shareholder activism. 
Specifically, non-targeted firms will interpret a shareholder resolution against a firm in their field 
as a challenge to their current field frames, and will thus follow the same process of frame re-
theorization and modification, leading to the development of practices more consonant with 
those espoused by the shareholder activists. Our suggestion that social activists influence 
corporate behavior not only among the targeted firms but also among others in their institutional 
field extend den Hond and de Bakker’s (2007) model to incorporate this spillover effect.  
Hypothesis 2: A firm is more likely to engage in practices consistent with the aims of a 
social movement when firms within the same institutional field have been targeted by a 
shareholder resolution on a related social issue. 
 
Public politics 
We suggest that the relationship between public politics and frame changes exhibits 
similar direct and spillover dynamics. In describing how pressures associated with campaigns for 
more stringent government legislation and regulation affect organizations’ field frames, we 11 
 
emphasize the importance of the public political context in two literatures that, in their quest to 
focus on private actions, have shifted nearly entirely away from their roots in public politics. 
First, most research on private politics either focuses exclusively on that domain or posits private 
and public politics as alternative strategic choices. Second, despite ample evidence that political 
context influences both the character and success of social movements (Bailey, 2004; Ingram and 
Rao 2004; McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1998), the role of the state has been relatively 
under explored in recent extensions of social movements theory intended to explain social 
activism that targets organizations. 
We believe political context to be crucial to understanding why and how corporations 
respond to private political pressures. Because many activist organizations can engage 
simultaneously or consecutively in private and public politics (Baron and Diermeier, 2007; 
Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider, 2003; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007), “private politics 
often takes place in the shadow of government” (Baron, 2003: 45). Many shareholder 
resolutions, in fact, employ the threat of public politics to influence corporate practices. A 2007 
shareholder resolution filed with the Hartford Financial Services Group, for example, referenced 
political and regulatory uncertainty: “Governments are starting to introduce policies to tackle the 
causes and combat the effects of greenhouse gas emissions, and these policies will alter the 
economics of entire industries. They will affect company share prices, both positively and 
negatively” (KLD Research & Analytics, 2008).
4  
                                                 
4 Similarly, a 2007 shareholder resolution calling on CVS Caremark Corporation to increase its focus on energy 
efficiency and publicly report its progress included an implicit regulatory threat in the statement that “in the U.S., 
over 45 bills dealing with energy efficiency were introduced to Congress in the first six months of 2006. Domestic 
regulations addressing the matter continue to gain momentum.... Ignoring this quickly growing trend could position 
our company as an industry laggard and expose it to competitive, reputational, and regulatory risk” (KLD Research 
& Analytics, 2008). 12 
 
Regulatory threat and organizational change 
Organizations often respond to threats of tighter government regulation by adopting 
forms of self-regulation in an attempt to credibly signal to the government that the desired 
behavior is occurring even without additional regulation (Lyon and Maxwell, 2002; Maxwell, 
Lyon, and Hackett, 2000). Managers of chemical manufacturing plants (King and Lenox, 2000), 
alpine ski resorts (Rivera, deLeon, and Koerber, 2006), and nuclear power plants (Rees, 1994), 
for example, have developed industry self-regulation programs to deter political movements that 
sought to intensify regulatory oversight.  
We suggest that threatened regulations that would require significant changes to current 
practices are, like shareholder resolutions, interpreted by firms as challenges to the financial 
legitimacy of the frames that structure their activities. This assertion is consistent with deterrence 
theory, which suggests that firms’ cooperation with existing state regulations is motivated by the 
costs of non-compliance, such as regulatory penalties and fines. Empirical research in an array of 
domains has found regulatory agency monitoring to motivate monitored firms to bring their 
practices into regulatory compliance (“specific deterrence”) (Cohen, 2000; Short and Toffel, 
2008). We suggest that threats of further regulation are thus likely to prompt firms to reconsider 
their frames in light of the regulator’s agenda, and launch the change process outlined above to 
develop frames that endorse new practices. These new frames might legitimize the voluntary 
self-regulation programs detailed by other scholars as well as a new repertoire of individual 
practices consistent with the aims of a related social movement. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: A firm is more likely to engage in practices consistent with the aims of a 
social movement if it is threatened by government regulation on a related social issue.  
Regulatory threat and field-level change  13 
 
We hypothesize that regulatory threats will influence not only the firms likely to be 
targeted, but also other firms within the same institutional field. This spillover effect is consistent 
with the notion of “general deterrence” from theories of optimal regulatory penalties and 
enforcement, whereby the effect of a regulatory enforcement activity on a particular firm often 
influences many other firms to improve their compliance (Cohen, 2000). A general deterrence 
effect has been found in a wide array of regulatory domains. Regulatory compliance behaviors 
can be influenced by, for example, high-profile enforcement actions against other firms 
(Thornton, Gunningham, and Kagan, 2005), regulatory penalties imposed on other organizations 
within the same state (Shimshack and Ward, 2005, 2008), and regulatory agency programs that 
announce heightened inspection priority to specific industries or groups of facilities engaged in 
particular regulated activities (Short and Toffel, 2008). This work suggests that punitive actions 
against firms that violate the law often prompt other firms within the same institutional field, 
fearful of being targeted next, to redouble their compliance efforts.  
Whereas the general deterrence literature is focused on the effects of enforcing existing 
regulations, we propose that threatened regulations are likely to inspire similar responses by 
firms. Specifically, we suggest that firms that share an institutional field (e.g., state, country) 
with firms threatened by existing regulations are likely to view themselves as possible targets of 
future regulation, and interpret these threats as challenges to their current field frames. Some will 
follow the same practice of frame modification, spurring adoption of practices more consistent 
with the threatened regulation. We therefore hypothesize that, 
Hypothesis 4: A firm is more likely to engage in practices consistent with the aims of a 
social movement if other firms in its field are threatened by government regulation on a 
related social issue.  
 14 
 
DATA AND MEASURES  
Empirical context and sample 
We test these hypotheses in the context of the climate change movement, a global social 
movement that has been working on several fronts to encourage meaningful changes in the 
practices of businesses and individuals. At the international level, scientists affiliated with the 
UN’s International Panel on Climate Change are working to examine and publicize climate 
change science. Within nations, activist groups are working at three levels: pressuring national 
and local governments to adopt climate change legislation; targeting citizens with calls for more 
responsible consumption; and, increasingly, targeting businesses directly through publicity 
campaigns and coordinated shareholder actions (Slater, 2007). 
Although this movement has the end goal of reducing emissions and the effects of 
climate change, it is also heavily engaged in encouraging businesses to be transparent about their 
greenhouse gas emissions, and calls for transparency have recently escalated (Kolk, 2008).
5 
During our sample period of 2006-2007, there were in the United States no legal requirements 
that firms track or report greenhouse gas emissions or create and publicize strategies to address 
climate change risks, and few firms did so. 
We focus on all companies listed in the S&P 500 Index because these companies were 
simultaneously asked to support the climate change movement in 2006 and 2007. In February of 
each of these years, the president or chief executive officer of every S&P 500 company received 
                                                 
5 Environmental activists have a long tradition of lobbying corporations to increase transparency through 
information disclosure (O’Rourke, 2003). In 1991, for example, socially responsible investors and major 
environmental organizations collaborated to establish the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
(CERES), which developed the Valdez Principles. As shareholder activists began to lobby corporations to endorse 
these ten environmental principles, the CERES project director stated, “The number one issue is disclosure. We 
want a standardized way of letting investment managers know about environmental aspects of the business” 
(Hoffman, 1996: 54). 15 
 
the same letter from the CDP.
6 The executives were asked to complete a questionnaire to 
describe the risks and opportunities climate change posed to their businesses, outline their 
corporate strategies for managing these risks and opportunities, and detail their greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
Our empirical context enables us to examine how direct and indirect pressures exerted 
through public and private politics influenced these companies’ responses. Our context also 
provides an “even treatment” that avoids selection issues because all companies in our sample 
received the same invitation at the same time. Due to membership changes in the S&P 500 Index 
during 2006 and 2007, our sample includes a total of 524 firms and 989 firm-years. 
Dependent variable 
Our analysis focuses on companies’ decisions about whether to adopt this public 
disclosure practice, which we measure by observing which firms publicly responded to the 
questionnaire. Those that did so provided information about their greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change strategies not only to the hundreds of institutional shareholders CDP represented, 
but also allowed CDP to post their responses in a public database on its website, which CDP 
notes constitutes “the largest repository of corporate greenhouse gas emissions data in the 
world.”
7 Corporations that disclose such information generate opportunities for dialogue with 
their stakeholders about the amount and defensibility of their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Importantly, the database not only includes the questionnaire responses from the companies that 
publicly disclosed this information, but also lists the companies that declined to do so.  
                                                 
6 Scholars have used CDP data to analyze multinational corporations’ political strategies with respect to climate 
change (Kolk and Pinske, 2007) and to assess stock market reactions to disclosing climate change strategies (Kim 
and Lyon, 2007). 
7 The CDP questionnaire, the status of each firm’s response, and the actual responses by firms that responded 
publicly are available at http://www.CDProject.net 16 
 
Our dependent variable, public disclosure, is a dichotomous variable coded “1” for years 
in which a company responded to CDP’s questionnaire and permitted its response to be posted 
on CDP’s website, and “0” otherwise. We coded this variable based on data from CDP’s website 




From the KLD Research & Analytics SOCRATES database, we obtained data on 
shareholder resolutions on climate change, environmental disclosure, and other environmental 
issues filed by members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. Table 1 reports the 
frequency with which these resolutions targeted S&P 500 companies during our sample period. 
We coded shareholder resolution target, a dichotomous variable, “1” when a firm had been 
targeted by at least one environmental shareholder resolution in a given year, and “0” if it had 
not been targeted by any environmental shareholder resolutions that year.
9  
To assess whether shareholder resolutions have a spillover effect from the targeted firm 
to others in its industry, we measured the number of shareholder resolutions targeting others in 
the industry. We did this by calculating the total number of environmental shareholder actions 
filed against all other firms that shared the focal firm’s primary 2-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code in a given year.  
                                                 
8 In using this measure, we assume that CDP responses represent an unbiased estimate of whether S&P 500 
companies publicly disclosed their carbon strategies, risks, and emissions through any public communication venue. 
To ensure that firms that had not publicly responded to the CDP survey had not publicly disclosed this information 
elsewhere (e.g., in an annual report or on a corporate website), we drew from our sample a random sample of 15 
companies that had not publicly disclosed to the CDP and searched their company websites. We found no evidence 
that any of these companies had disclosed greenhouse gas emissions or strategies in 2006 or 2007, the relevant years 
in our analysis, which supports the validity of our measure. 
9 We calculated the number of shareholder resolutions targeted against each firm in each year. Only 2.5% of the 
firms in our sample having been targeted by more than one resolution in a given year, we avoid spurious results 
from these outlier cases by employing the conservative approach of using a dummy variable rather than a count. 17 
 
Public politics 
No federal or state regulations in the United States required companies to disclose, or 
even calculate, their greenhouse gas emissions during our sample period.  That said, state 
legislatures exhibited varying levels of enthusiasm for the potential to impose laws that would 
constrain greenhouse gas emissions. In 2005, several states in New England and the mid-Atlantic 
region created the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) as part of developing a cap-and-
trade program for carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The charter members were 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. 
Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island joined in 2007. California passed legislation in 2006 
that committed it to aggressive emissions reduction targets, but left unclear the regulatory 
approach and scope of targeted industries. In February 2007, several states in the western United 
States formed the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) to implement a joint strategy for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Created by the governors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, 
Oregon, and Washington, WCI was joined several months later by Utah and Montana (as well as 
by several Canadian provinces).  
We divided companies headquartered in states posing regulatory threats into two groups 
based on how likely their industry was to be targeted. We created a dummy variable state posing 
regulatory threat and sector likely targeted, which was coded “1” for companies headquartered 
in these states and in industrial sectors likely to be targeted by these regulations, starting the year 
the state joined either RGGI or WCI, and in 2006 for California (otherwise coded “0”). For 
RGGI states, the only targeted sector was electric utilities. Although the scope of the WCI had 
not been finalized during the period of our analysis, a consensus had been reached that emissions 
regulations in those states would also target electric utilities, and most alternative plans under 18 
 
consideration at the time also targeted the transportation sector and large sources of stationary 
combustion including oil refining, cement manufacturing, pulp and paper manufacturing, and 
hydrogen production.
10 This measures specific deterrence effects.   
To measure general deterrence effects, we created another dummy variable, state posing 
regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted. For companies headquartered in these states but 
in other industrial sectors, this variable was coded “1” starting the year the state joined either 
RGGI or WCI, and in 2006 for California (otherwise coded “0”). 
Control variables 
We gathered data on a variety of factors that might also influence companies’ decisions 
to publicly disclose environmental information. Because organizations are more likely to respond 
to shareholders with larger ownership stakes (David, Bloom, and Hillman, 2007), companies 
with a larger proportion of shareholders that were the institutional investors on whose behalf 
CDP sends it questionnaires might be expected to perceive a greater coercive influence to 
respond. We controlled for this by calculating for each company the proportion of shares held 
by CDP signatories. We used data from Thomson Financial, which tracks the shares held by 
mutual funds, institutional investors, and financial insiders, to identify the total number of shares 
held by CDP signatories in each company in the last reported quarter of each year. We then 
divided this by each company’s total number of shares outstanding at year end, a figure obtained 
from the CRSP/Compustat database. To reduce the potential for outliers to confound our results, 
we top coded to this value values above the 95
th percentile of this distribution (a 29.5% 
ownership stake).  
                                                 
10 Western Climate Initiative Scope Subcommittee. Summary of Major Design Options Under Consideration. 
January 2, 2008. Available at http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O104F14641.pdf, accessed 
June 28, 2008. 19 
 
Because prior research found a significant correlation between companies’ public 
disclosure of environmental information and environmental performance (Cho and Patten 2007; 
Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2008; Patten, 2002), we controlled for environmental 
performance using pounds of toxic chemicals emitted into the environment, following Patten 
(2002). Specifically, we measured environmental performance as the pounds of annual toxic 
chemical emissions released by all domestic subsidiaries of each company. We obtained toxic 
chemical emissions data from the Corporate Environmental Profiles Directory (CEPD) database, 
created by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, which aggregates facility-level data from 
the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) database. Our 
analysis uses 2004 TRI emissions data, the most recent year available in the CEPD, and includes 
production waste, transfers, and releases. Our models include log toxic chemical emissions (we 
take the log after adding 1 to the number of pounds) to mitigate the effect of outliers.
11 
Because several previous studies have found a significant relationship between company 
size and environmental information disclosure (e.g., Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Patten, 1992; Patten, 2002), we obtained from Compustat data on company-wide 
employment and net sales.
12 Because prior research has also revealed significant differences 
between industries in the amount of environmental and social information companies disclose 
(Cho and Patten, 2007; Kolk and Pinkse, 2007; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992) and in how firms 
                                                 
11 Ideally, when measuring corporate environmental performance with TRI data, a weighting scheme should be 
incorporated to accommodate the wide variation in TRI chemicals’ toxicity, fate, and transport (Toffel and Marshall, 
2004). We were unable to do so because of CEPD’s proprietary approach to aggregating TRI data from factories to 
parent firms. Our results were unchanged when we omitted this control variable and when we controlled for 
environmental performance using two substitute measures—the log sum of compliance violations regarding nine 
major federal environmental statutes and/or the log count of environmental compliance violations—based on data 
obtained from the CEPD. 
12 Compustat calculates net sales as “gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular sales 
completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances for 
which credit is given to customers,” according to Standard & Poor’s Research Insight North America: Data Guide. 
(McGraw-Hill Companies: Centennial, Colorado, 2004). 20 
 
respond to climate change (Jeswani, Wehrmeyer, and Mulugetta, 2008), we developed a series of 
dummy variables that correspond to each firm’s Russell industrial sector based on data from 
Russell Investments and from David Gardiner & Associates (2007). The composition of 
industries in our sample is reported in Table 2. 
Model specification  
We estimate the following logistic regression model to examine the effects of private and 
public politics on the propensity of firms to publicly disclose information about their climate 
strategies: 
Pr(yijst = 1) = F(1 Rit + 2 Iijt + 3 List + 4 Uist + 5 Xit +  Tt + i ) 
where i indexes firms, j indexes a firm’s industry, s indexes a firm’s headquarters state, t indexes 
the year, and yijst is the dependent variable public disclosure. The explanatory variable that 
measures the effects of private politics at the organizational level is shareholder resolution target 
(Rit); field level effects are captured by shareholder resolutions targeted against others in the 
industry (Iijt). The explanatory variable that measures the specific deterrence effect of public 
politics is state posing regulatory threat and sector likely targeted (List); the general deterrence 
effect is captured by state posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted (Uist).
13 The 
vector of control variables, Xit, includes proportion of shares held by CDP signatories, log toxic 
chemical emissions,  log employment,  log net sales, and a series of dummies for Russell 
industrial sectors. Tt  is a year dummy to account for unobserved changes in norms and 
expectations that occurred between 2006 and 2007. 
                                                 
13 Including both of these variables does not result in an over-specified model because they are time variant and both 
are always coded “0” for firms headquartered in states that do not pose a regulatory threat. Our specification is 
largely equivalent to including one dummy variable that captures state regulatory threat and an interaction term of 
that variable with another dummy that captures whether the sector is a likely target of the threatened regulation. Our 
specification yields coefficients that can be interpreted more intuitively. 21 
 
We avoid simultaneity concerns by lagging all independent variables one year, with two 
exceptions. Because shareholder action directed against a particular firm was a relatively rare 
event but one that we believe has an enduring influence, we coded this variable “1” if a firm was 
targeted by at least one shareholder resolution in the past two years. For our toxic chemical 
emissions measure, we are constrained by our data source to 2004 data, which provides for a 2-
year lag for 2006 disclosure decisions and a 3-year lag for 2007 disclosure decisions. Our public 
politics variable is lagged one year because state legislation is publicly discussed well before it 
becomes official, hence, proposed legislation might affect companies’ disclosure behavior the 
year before it is officially promulgated.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Table 3. Of the 989 CDP 
questionnaires sent in 2006 and 2007, companies responded publicly in 433 instances (44%). 
The remaining 56% either failed to respond or did so privately. The low degree of correlation 
observed between our variables gives little cause for concern about multicollinearity. 
The results of our main logistic regression model are presented as Model 1 in Table 4, 
which displays both odds ratios and marginal effects. We cluster standard errors by firm to 
account for heteroscedasticity and non-independence among observations from firms included in 
both years. We interpret the magnitude of our coefficient estimates using marginal effects 
estimated at the mean of all other variables.  
Being targeted with a shareholder resolution more than doubled the odds that a firm 
would publicly report (OR=2.5; p<0.01), which supports Hypothesis 1. This corresponds to a 
marginal effect of 22% based on the mean value of all variables. Setting this variable to “1” and 
all other variables to their means, we calculated that firms targeted with at least one 22 
 
environmental shareholder resolution had a 62% predicted probability of publicly disclosing to 
the CDP. This figure was 40% for firms not targeted by any environmental shareholder 
resolutions.  
Our results also indicate that shareholder resolutions have spillover effects on other firms 
in a targeted industry, which supports Hypothesis 2. Each additional environmental shareholder 
resolution lodged against another firm in the focal firm’s industry during the prior two years 
increases by a factor of 1.06 (p=0.07) the odds that the focal firm will publicly report. Calculated 
at the mean of all other variables, the predicted probability that a firm will publicly disclose to 
the CDP ranged from 38%, when no other firms in its industry were targeted with an 
environmental shareholder resolution, to 63% when those firms faced a total of 17 environmental 
shareholder resolutions, the maximum for any industry-year in our dataset. A one-standard 
deviation increase in the number of such resolutions (3.23) increases the probability of publicly 
reporting from a baseline of 42%, the predicted probability calculated at the mean of all 
variables, to 46%.  
We also find evidence of the influence of public politics. Our results indicate that all 
firms headquartered in states posing a regulatory threat and in sectors likely to be targeted 
publicly disclosed to the CDP. In the logistic model, this situation (perfectly predicting success) 
caused this variable and the 16 observations for which it was coded “1” to drop out of the model. 
Re-estimating the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression provides an estimated 
coefficient on this variable (Model 2 in Table 4). The OLS model indicates that firms 
headquartered in states with threatened regulations and in sectors likely to be targeted were 24% 
more likely (p<0.01) than firms in the same industries in other states to publicly disclose. These 
results provide strong support for the specific deterrence effect predicted by Hypothesis 3. 23 
 
Our results also indicate that firms headquartered in states with threatened regulations, 
but in industries unlikely to be targeted, were 7.6% (OR=1.37; p=0.09) more likely to publicly 
disclose to CDP than firms in their industries but in other states. This finding suggests a general 
deterrence effect, whereby regulatory threats influence the practices even of firms not directly 
targeted by the threat, and supports Hypothesis 4. 
We used the OLS results to compare the magnitudes of the direct and spillover effects of 
public politics on disclosure practices. A Wald test indicated that the direct regulatory threat (on 
firms in sectors likely targeted) is significantly stronger (F=5.3; p=0.02) than the spillover effect 
on firms in sectors unlikely to be regulated but also headquartered in states posing regulatory 
threats. 
As a robustness test, we re-estimated all models using OLS and obtained results nearly 
identical to those produced by our logistic models. The magnitudes and significance levels of the 
coefficients on the hypothesized variables were also similar 
Graphical depiction of results 
Figure 1 presents regression results graphically to facilitate interpretation. We consider 
four types of firms based on whether they were (1) targeted by at least one shareholder resolution 
and (2) headquartered in a state in which emissions regulations were threatened. Using logistic 
regression, we estimate a slightly simplified version of Model 1. Here, we combine the two 
regulatory threat variables into a single dummy variable coded “1” for all firms headquartered in 
a state posing regulatory threat (regardless of industry), and “0” otherwise.  As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the probability that each of these four types of firms will publicly disclose to the CDP 
varies depending on the number of shareholder resolutions targeted at other firms within the 
same industry. We glean several insights from this graphical display of our results. First, we 24 
 
observe that the highest of the four lines corresponds to the predicted probability of firms 
targeted by a shareholder resolution and headquartered in states in which emissions regulations 
were threatened (targets/threat). The lowest line corresponds to the opposite type, those not 
targeted by resolutions and headquartered elsewhere (not targets/no threat). We note that the 
minimum value of the former line is above the maximum value of the latter line, indicating that 
the predicted probability of publicly disclosing to CDP is always higher among firms that were 
both targets of shareholder resolutions and headquartered in states with a regulatory threat 
compared to those that were neither so targeted nor headquartered in those states, regardless of 
the number of shareholder resolutions in the industry. 
Second, we note that the four lines do not cross, which indicates that, at any particular 
frequency of shareholder resolutions at the industry level, the ranking of the four types of firms 
with respect to the relative probability of publicly disclosing was consistent. Interestingly, the 
consistent ranking depicted in this graph reveals that firms targeted with a shareholder resolution 
but not headquartered in a state in which emissions regulations were threatened (i.e., firms that 
faced direct private politics but not public politics) were more likely than firms in the opposite 
situation (i.e., those that faced public, but not direct private, politics) to publicly disclose. 
Extension: Environmentally sensitive industries 
In their recent empirical analysis of environmental information disclosure in annual 
reports (10-Ks), Cho and Patten (2007: 642) hypothesized that such information was more likely 
to be disclosed by firms in environmentally sensitive industries because such firms “face greater 
exposure to the public policy process than companies from non-environmentally sensitive 
industries.” Indeed, they found that such firms were more likely to disclose some forms of 
environmental information (e.g., expenditures on pollution control and abatement) in their annual 25 
 
reports. Similarly, Lyon and Maxwell (2006) predict greater transparency among firms in 
industries that have socially or environmentally damaging impacts. 
We assess whether firms in environmentally sensitive industries that face a heightened 
threat of regulatory scrutiny were more likely than firms in other industries to publicly disclose 
to the CDP, especially when they were targeted by a shareholder resolution and based in a state 
with an uncertain regulatory environment. We distinguished firms that operate in 
environmentally sensitive industries based on Cho and Patten’s classification (2007: 643). We 
coded this dichotomous variable “1” (yes) for firms in the Auto and Transport, Integrated Oils, 
Utilities, and Other Energy industrial sectors, and “0” (no) for firms in Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Financial Services, Health Care, Materials & Processing, Producer Durables, 
Technology, and other industrial sectors. 
We modified our original logistic regression model by interacting our explanatory 
variables with these two new dichotomous variables.
14 This specification enabled us to 
decompose the effects of our explanatory variables into separate estimates for environmentally 
sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive industries.
15 Our results are displayed as Model 3 in 
Table 4. Compared to firms than had not been targeted by shareholder resolutions, firms that had 
been targeted and were in environmentally sensitive industries were 46% (p<0.01) more likely to 
publicly disclose, whereas firms that had been targeted but were not in environmentally sensitive 
industries were only 14% (p=0.105) more likely to publicly disclose. A Wald test revealed these 
                                                 
14 To ensure that including these interaction terms is a reasonable approach in our context, we tested for differences 
in unobserved variation across the two groups (environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive) using 
the method developed by Allison (1999) that was implemented by Hoetker (2007). These two tests failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of equal residual variation (Likelihood-ratio test and Wald 
2 tests each yielded 
2 = 0.00, 
p=0.99), providing no evidence of any concern regarding the use of these interaction terms in our logit model. 
15 Because all firms headquartered in states that threatened carbon regulation in industries that were likely to be 
targeted were categorized as environmentally sensitive, we were unable to include interaction terms for State posing 
regulatory threat and sector likely targeted.  26 
 
coefficients to differ significantly (
2=4.64; p=0.03). In contrast, we found between the 
environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive industries no significant differences 
in how the other explanatory variables affected firms’ propensity to publicly disclose to the CDP.  
DISCUSSION  
In summary, we find strong support for our hypotheses that firms are more likely to agree 
to engage in practices consistent with the aims of a social movement if they (Hypothesis 1) or 
other firms in their industry (Hypothesis 2) have already been targeted by a shareholder 
resolution on a related issue. We also show that political context affects the success of a social 
movement in that firms under threat of regulation related to the social movement are more likely 
to agree to engage in practices consistent with the aims of the movement (Hypothesis 3), as are 
firms that share an institutional field with firms under threat of regulation (Hypothesis 4). We 
now discuss implications of our findings for theory and empirical work in these areas.  
Firm responses to private politics  
Direct effects of private politics  
Our results suggest that companies respond to private politics by adopting new practices 
that adhere to the underlying objective of the social activists. This finding is highly relevant to 
activist shareholders, for whom “the best possible outcome from a shareholder engagement 
campaign is that the company agrees to substantial changes in practice” (O’Rourke 2003:234).  
This outcome has also been observed anecdotally, as when climate change activists targeted 
several firms including American Electric Power, British Petroleum, Home Depot, Ford, and 
Chevron Texaco. After being subjected to sustained campaigns, each of these firms revisited its 
current practices and “variously agreed to disclose their greenhouse-gas emissions, study the 
impact of climate change on their businesses, [and] invest in renewable energy sources or 27 
 
support a mandatory carbon cap” (Slater, 2007: 3). Similarly, Allegheny Energy, Inc. opposed 
the shareholder resolution described earlier in this paper, but subsequently consented to the 
request by the CDP to publicly disclose its greenhouse gas emissions, climate change-related 
risks, and abatement strategies.
16  
We argue that these changes to organizational practice result from companies going 
through the process of field frame re-theorization. A number of scholars have conjectured that 
shareholder actions lead companies to change their practices through closed-door meetings in 
which off-the-record deals are struck between management and activists, whereby the companies 
agree to implement some of the proposed practices in exchange for the activists withdrawing 
their proposals (O’Rourke, 2003; Proffitt and Spicer, 2006; Rehbein et al., 2004). For example, 
Amoco resisted calls by nine religious groups that proposed a shareholder resolution that called 
for the company to adopt the Valdez Principles, but reached a negotiated settlement. In exchange 
for the withdrawal of the proposal, the company agreed to abide by one of the principles and to 
publish an environmental progress report (Hoffman, 1996: 55). The company subsequently 
enacted several other management practices aligned with the Valdez Principles. 
We maintain that this negotiation process is consistent with our theory of frame changes, 
as the proposed explanation represents simply a prolonged interaction between management and 
the activist group, and still results in modifications to organizational practices that are consistent 
with the general aims of the activists. Our data, in encompassing all proposed shareholder 
resolutions, grouped resolutions that were withdrawn with those that were voted on. We 
encourage future research to examine the effect of variations in resolutions’ fates (withdrawn or 
voted on) on whether and how companies modify organizational practices. We offer our findings 
                                                 
16 Carbon Disclosure Project website: 
http://www.CDProject.net/online_response.asp?cid=492&id=5&exp=0&desc=All+Companies&letter=A&year=2 28 
 
as support for the general theory of organizational change through frame change, and suggest 
that a more specific understanding of the processes by which shareholder challenges transform 
field-frames might be explored through qualitative case studies of social activists’ campaigns 
against targeted firms. Such work might also explore how and whether firms follow up on the 
promises that lead shareholders to withdraw their proposals.  
Spillover effects of private politics 
Our results also indicate that shareholder activism directed at a single firm can spur 
industry-wide changes in practices, a relationship that has been conjectured by others (e.g., 
Karpoff, 2001; Rehbein et al., 2004), but to the best of our knowledge had been neither formally 
theorized nor empirically tested. We suggest a strategic reason why companies might respond 
with frame changes to activists’ challenges to other firms. Specifically, we posit that managers 
are aware that activist groups often object to a set of management practices rather than to a 
particular firm, and that they are likely to target, in turn, each company in an industry until the 
practice is eradicated. Thus, an activist challenge to a specific company functions as a challenge 
to all firms in the field.  
Our findings regarding the spillover effects of private politics parallels research on the 
dynamics of collective reputation. Recent work in that domain has found that one firm’s 
reputation can spill over to affect that of its rivals (Goins and Gruca, 2008), and that industry and 
geography can influence expectations with respect to a firm’s corporate social actions (Bertels 
and Peloza, 2008). A similar effect has also been observed following corporate raider activity 
(Walsh and Kosnik, 1993), namely, non-targeted firms within the same industry as a firm 
targeted by corporate raiders also responded to the raider’s challenge by changing their practices. 
Future research could explore whether the process of field frame re-theorization examined in this 29 
 
paper could explain these dynamics, and identify other domains where such spillover effects 
operate.  
Firm responses to public politics 
By highlighting the relevance of political context to corporate response to social activism, 
our study makes an important contribution to existing theories of how social movements 
penetrate organizations. Social movements scholars have long known that social activism does 
not occur in a vacuum, and that political context and opportunities might affect the tactics and 
influence the success of social activism (e.g., McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 
2004). Yet, to date, the legislative and regulatory context has been under-examined by empirical 
work that extends social movements theory to the study of organizations. Our results highlight 
the importance of maintaining the public politics roots of social movements theory even as the 
theory is extended into this new domain. Further, our results call for renewed emphasis on the 
role of political context in the analysis of shareholder and other stakeholders’ activism directed at 
corporations.  
Our findings also suggest that public politics are more than just context: they might also 
prompt organizational change. Whereas den Hond and de Bakker’s (2007) framework of social 
activist-inspired organizational change focused explicitly on activist groups as the initiating 
change agent, our results suggest that government actors should also be considered change 
agents capable of challenging institutional frames. Specifically, government action on social 
movements issues, such as the threat of new legislation or regulations, can alter the sets of 
practices both targeted and non-targeted companies deem appropriate. This result suggests that 
deterrence theory is relevant not only within its traditional purview of law and economics 
scholarship, but can also contribute to our understanding of organizational change. 30 
 
Our findings regarding regulatory threats have an important implication for future work 
in private politics, namely, that scholars interested in private politics ought also to attend to the 
political context to deepen their analysis of how and why private politics affects corporate 
behavior. Future work might also consider the dynamics of the relationship between private and 
public politics. Because private political actions might be less costly than attempts to mobilize 
enough of the citizenry to sway government agendas, private politics activities might serve as a 
leading indicator of latent social movements that might ultimately garner enough citizen support 
to become public political issues (Hoffman, 1996; Vogel, 1978). Finally, as many activist groups 
engage in both public and private political activities simultaneously (Dalton et al., 2003), future 
work might examine how activists integrate their public and private political strategies in venues 
such as the UN, World Health Organization, and other multi-stakeholder organizations.  
Research contributions  
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature that applies social movements theory to 
the study of the emergence and tactics of collective action that targets corporations (Bartley and 
Child, 2007; Davis and Thompson, 1994; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; King, 2008; King and 
Soule, 2007). Perhaps most closely related to our work is a study of shareholder proposals on 
international human rights and labor standards that employs social movements theory to explain 
the increasing prevalence of these topics as shareholder resolutions and the prominent role of 
religious organizations as their authors (Proffitt and Spicer, 2006). In contrast to their focus on 
activists and their agendas, we apply and extend social movements and organizational change 
theories in order to understand firms’ responses to activists’ requests and public political 
pressure.  31 
 
We advance den Hond and de Bakker’s (2007) model of activist-inspired organizational 
field-frame change by providing evidence that government regulators might function similarly to 
social activists, and demonstrating that firm- and industry-targeted activist and regulatory 
pressures might affect a broader range of firms in the institutional field. Despite some 
speculation that shareholder groups might file resolutions to raise managerial and public 
consciousness on particular issues in the hope of prompting more general changes in corporate 
practices (David et al., 2007; Rehbein et al., 2004), we are aware of no prior research that has 
articulated these mechanisms or empirically tested these ideas.  
Our work also contributes to the organizational literature that describes how firms 
respond to stakeholders (Oliver, 1991), including instrumental stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995). 
Our research builds on prior studies that have explored the conditions under which firms respond 
to external stakeholders (e.g., Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997; Eesley and Lenox, 2006; King, 
2008), and particularly within the domain of environmental and corporate social performance 
(Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Wood, 1991). Our research demonstrates that firms’ responses to 
activist groups’ requests are contingent on their prior interaction with other stakeholders (i.e., 
activist shareholders and government regulators) as well as on prior interactions between 
stakeholders and other firms in the same institutional field. In considering multiple stakeholders 
and tactics, shareholder activists who initiate shareholder resolutions and investors who request 
information, we respond to a call to consider the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders 
(Rowley, 1997). 
Finally, our study represents an important contribution to the limited empirical literature 
on private politics. Specifically, it answers Baron’s (2003) call for empirical research that 
examines how activist campaigns affect the operating policies of targeted firms and stimulate 32 
 
other firms to take proactive measures to avoid being targeted. Previous studies of private 
politics emphasized the social activists’ perspective by examining their motives, targeting 
choices, and campaign tactics (Bartley and Child, 2007; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; 
Friedman, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Henriques and Sharma, 2005; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; 
Proffitt and Spicer, 2006; Rehbein, Waddock, and Graves, 2004; Rowley and Moldoveaunu, 
2003; Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Our study contributes to the nascent literature that examines 
the opposite perspective: how companies respond to private politics. In identifying spillover 
effects of targeted social activism and highlighting the importance of political context to the 
success of private politics, we believe that our study points to several exciting new areas of 
scholarship on the role of social movements in fostering organizational change 
Limitations and future research  
Investigating the temporal dynamics of public and private politics represents a promising 
area of future research, akin to studies of institutional change over time (e.g., Hoffman, 1999). 
Our ability to analyze the long-term effects of shareholder activism and regulatory threats is 
limited by the fact that only two years’ of responses to the CDP survey were available for S&P 
500 member companies at the time of our study. As the CDP intends to continue surveying this 
group of companies, future work might explore longer-term trends by incorporating future cycles 
of CDP survey responses. Alternatively, scholars could examine response trends among the 
Financial Times (FT) 500, for which more years’ of survey response data are already available. 
In such a context, future research could also explore the importance of time lags in the 
relationship between shareholder resolutions and firms’ propensity to support a social movement. 
In addition, examining the progression of a social movement over time would enable future 
researchers to identify how the magnitude of the spillover effects we identified change over time, 33 
 
as an increasing proportion of organizations within an institutional field adopt the desired 
practices. 
In this study, we focus on only one possible outcome (publicly responding to CDP). 
Although we offer no evidence of broader changes in corporate norms, beliefs, and practices, 
previous research supports the link between a single changed practice and subsequent broader 
changes. In particular, a recent study of stakeholder management in the domain of sustainable 
development found that shifts in firms’ stakeholder management strategies required substantial 
changes in resource allocation, including: 
investments in green product and manufacturing technologies, in employee skills, 
in organizational competencies, in formal (routine-based) management systems 
and procedures, and, finally, in the reconfiguration of the strategic planning 
process. This implies that effective stakeholder management is much more than a 
skillful public relations exercise; it is the visible reflection of an underlying 
resource-based strategy (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003: 468).  
  
Similarly, we contend that publicly responding to CDP’s survey represents one facet of a 
firm’s perspective on climate change issues, as the action of responding requires an operational 
commitment to tracking greenhouse gas emissions, a normative commitment to the ethic of 
public disclosure, and an acknowledgement that climate change is an issue that requires some 
level of corporate attention. Future research might extend our work by examining how the 
factors we identify spawn broader changes in organizational and field-level norms, beliefs, and 
practices. Others might investigate how activists respond once targeted firms begin to adopt the 
desired practices. For example, under what circumstances do activists return to these initial 
targets to seek further changes, or move on to other targets within the same or different 
industries?  
Our analysis exploited variation in firm and industry characteristics to predict which 
firms were more likely to respond to private and public politics by changing their management 34 
 
practices. We focused on environmental shareholder resolutions and threat of greenhouse gas 
regulation, believing that these political tactics were particularly likely to prompt companies to 
initiate new practices regarding carbon disclosure. Supplementary analyses indicated that 
organizations’ general exposure to the social issue amplified the effectiveness of some of these 
tactics: firms in environmentally sensitive industries (e.g., electric utilities) appear to be 
particularly responsive to shareholder resolutions. Future research could deepen our 
understanding of these dynamics by exploring how changes in organizational practices might be 
prompted by other private and public political tactics (e.g., boycotts, protests, civil suits), and 
how these effects are mediated by internal firm dynamics (Weber, Thomas, and Rao, 2009).  
Our analysis focused on two possible mechanisms through which social movements seek 
to influence organizations: shareholder resolutions and regulatory threats. Future research might 
examine how the influence of social movements on organizations might be moderated by 
differences in geographic communities (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007), customers (Delmas 
and Toffel, 2008), the media (King and Haveman, 2008), and legal developments (Kalev, 
Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006). The influence of these various constituencies might also be more 
wide-ranging than suggested by the present paper. For instance, we might expect to see faster 
field-level diffusion after particularly reticent firms adopt new practices (Briscoe and Safford, 
2008). Future scholars might explore whether these processes might be mediated by the 
development of new field frames. 
Our study examines the influence of both activists and government actors on 
organizations. Future scholars should consider combining this more recent development of 
applying social movements theory to organizations with this theory’s traditional focus on how 
activists influence government actors. By combining these two streams of social movements 35 
 
theory, such studies could reveal novel insights about the complex, dynamic strategies and 
relationships between activists, organizations, and government actors. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study aimed to deepen our understanding of the relationship between social 
movements and firms by exploring how private and public politics associated with the climate 
change movement influence firms’ greenhouse gas emissions disclosure practices. We extend 
theory of social activism and organizational change by demonstrating that pressure from both 
shareholder activists and government regulators may elicit change in organizational practices, 
and that challenges mounted against a single firm or industry may spillover to influence behavior 
at the field level. Our study thus underscores the importance of considering both private and 
public politics in future studies of social movements and organizational change.  
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Table 1. Environmental shareholder resolution topics 
 
Shareholder resolution topic Resolutions Percent of total 
Climate change  33 35%
Environmental disclosure 14 15%
Emissions reduction 12 13%
Natural resources conservation 5 5%
Toxics phase-out  4 4%
Drilling in Arctic  4 4%
Pollution prevention 3 3%
Genetic engineering 3 3%
Renewable energy  2 2%
Other  14 15%
 
Note: This table reports the number of shareholder resolutions on environmental topics filed against 
companies in our sample during 2004-2006 by members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility, according to the KLD Research & Analytics SOCRATES database. There were none in 
our sample on three other environmental topics listed within the SOCRATES database: Endorse CERES 
principles, Nuclear phase-out, and Political contributions 
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Table 2. Sample industry composition 
  




Auto & transport  17 3% Yes
Consumer discretionary 91 17% No
Consumer staples  33 6% No
Financial services  102 19% No
Health care  49 9% No
Integrated oils  8 2% Yes
Materials & processing 38 7% No
Other  9 2% No
Other energy  26 5% Yes
Producer durables  39 7% No
Technology  69 13% No
Utilities  43 8% Yes
Total  524 100%   
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
  
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean SD  Min  Max
Public disclosure   0.44 0.50  0  1
Shareholder resolutions target  0.09 0.28  0  1
Shareholder resolutions target  ESI   0.03 0.17 0 1
Shareholder resolutions target  Not ESI  0.06 0.24 0 1
No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry  2.77 3.23  0  17
No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry  ESI  0.94 2.67 0  17
No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry  Not ESI 1.83 2.61 0 9
State posing regulatory threat and sector likely targeted 
a 0.02 0.13  0  1
State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted  0.42 0.49  0  1
State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted  ESI  0.02 0.13 0 1
State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted  Not ESI  0.40 0.49 0 1
Proportion of shares held by Carbon Disclosure Project signatories  14.89 7.59  0  29.51
Log toxic chemical emissions  2.90 5.39  0  19.33
Log net sales  8.89 1.50  0  12.75
Log employment  3.07 1.25  0  7.55
Environmentally sensitive industry  0.18 0.38  0  1
 
Panel B. Correlations 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
(1)  Public disclosure   1.00     
(2)  Shareholder resolution target  0.19 1.00     
(3)  No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry 0.17 0.09 1.00     
(4)  State posing regulatory threat and sector likely targeted  0.15 0.02 0.20 1.00    
(5)  State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted  -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 1.00   
(6)  Proportion of shares held by CDP signatories  0.03 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.04  1.00 
(7)  Log toxic chemical emissions  0.15 0.16 0.24 0.02 -0.04 0.04 1.00
(8)  Log net sales  0.24 0.23 0.03 0.06 -0.11 0.19 0.20 1.00
(9)  Log employment  0.22 0.14 -0.17 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.19 0.71 1.00
(10) Environmentally sensitive industry  0.16 0.12 0.36 0.27 -0.31 0.01 0.01 0.10 -
0.07
  
Notes: 989 firm-year observations. All independent variables are lagged one year, except the shareholder 
resolution variables, which are based on one- and two-year lags. CDP = Carbon Disclosure Project.  
ESI = Environmentally sensitive industry. 
a All sectors likely targeted by threatened regulation were categorized as environmentally sensitive 
industries, which prevented us from interacting this variable with ESI. 
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Table 4. Regression results 
  
Dependent variable: Public disclosure  
   (1a)  (1b)  (2)  (3a)  (3b)  (4) 
   logistic  OLS  logistic  OLS 
   OR  ME    OR  ME   
H1 Shareholder resolution target  2.512** 0.226  0.166**       
    [0.812]   [0.057]      
  Shareholder resolution target × ESI        9.447**  0.461  0.289** 
         [6.474]    [0.075] 
  Shareholder resolution target × Not ESI        1.790  0.144  0.118+ 
         [0.642]    [0.071] 
H2 No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry  1.061+  0.014  0.013+       
    [0.035]   [0.007]      
  No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry × ESI        1.024  0.006  0.005 
         [0.074]    [0.013] 
  No. shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry × Not ESI       1.083*  0.019  0.016* 
         [0.040]    [0.008] 
H3 State posing regulatory threat and sector likely targeted    Note 1   0.243**  Note  1   0.275** 
       [0.070]     [0.080] 
H4 State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted  1.369+  0.076  0.069+       
    [0.257]   [0.038]      
  State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted × ESI        2.345  0.210  0.168 
         [1.353]    [0.105] 
  State posing regulatory threat but sector unlikely targeted × Not ESI        1.332  0.070  0.063 
               [0.262]     [0.040] 
  Proportion of shares held by CDP signatories  0.977 -0.006  -0.004  0.978 -0.005  -0.004 
    [0.016]   [0.003]  [0.016]   [0.003] 
  Log toxic chemical emissions  0.999 0.000  -0.000 0.995  -0.001  -0.001 
    [0.021]   [0.004]  [0.021]   [0.004] 
 Log  net  sales  1.392* 0.080  0.071* 1.397* 0.081  0.073* 
    [0.197]   [0.029]  [0.204]   [0.029] 
 Log  employment    1.356* 0.074  0.059* 1.374* 0.077  0.059* 
      [0.199]     [0.029]  [0.206]     [0.029] 
  Observations  973  989  973   989 
  Firms  516  524  516   524 
  McFadden’s R-squared (for logistic) or R-squared (for OLS)  0.15    0.21  0.16    0.21 
  Wald chi-squared (for logistic) or Wald F (for OLS)  117.4**    18.52**  119.2**    14.65** 
  Log-likelihood  -562.16    -558.81    
Both models are estimated with logistic regression, with odds ratios (OR) and marginal effects (ME) calculated at the 
mean of all variables. As a robustness test, the models were also estimated using OLS (Models 2 and 4). Brackets contain 
robust standard errors clustered by firm. The dependent variable refers to whether the company responded publicly to the 
Carbon Disclosure Project. All independent variables listed in the table are lagged one year, except shareholder resolution 
target and number of shareholder resolutions targeting others in the industry, which are based on one- and two-year lags. 
Both models also include industry dummies, a year dummy for 2007, and dummies denoting the few instances in which 
annual sales, employment, environmental performance, or proportion of shareholders that were CDP signatories data were 
not available and thus recoded from missing to zero. Models 1 and 2 report the results of our main model. Models 3 and 4 
report the results of our extension, which examines whether the main explanatory variables affect firms’ decision to 
publicly disclose to the CDP equally across firms within and outside environmentally sensitive industries (ESI).  
ESI = Environmentally sensitive industry. CDP=Carbon Disclosure Project. 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
Note 1: State regulatory threat and sector likely targeted perfectly predicted success (i.e., was “1” for all observations for 
which this variable was coded “1”), and thus this variable and these 16 observations dropped out of the sample when estimated 
with logistic regression. All sectors likely targeted by threatened regulation were categorized as environmentally sensitive 
industries, which prevented us from interacting this variable with ESI.  45 
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